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INTRODUCTION
On October 22, 2015, President Obama exercised his veto power for
just the fifth time to veto the 2016 National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA).1 The NDAA sets out the annual budget and expenditures for the
United States Department of Defense and specifies policies in connection
with such expenditures. In his veto statement, the President objected to,
among other issues, the provisions relating to detainees held at
Guantánamo Bay.2 The President wrote that the bill fails “to remove
unwarranted restrictions on the transfer of detainees,” and indeed
“impose[s] more onerous ones.”3 This, President Obama argued,
undermines the flexibility necessary to address the detainees at
Guantánamo Bay, including making determinations regarding which
“detainees [would] remain at Guantánamo . . . when and where to prosecute
them . . . and when and where to transfer them consistent with our national
security and our humane treatment policy.”4 When President Obama finally
signed the bill into law, in a signing statement he again objected to
“language that would reenact, and in some cases expand, restrictions
concerning the detention facility at Guantánamo Bay.”5 This language, he
maintained, may “violate constitutional separation of powers principles.”6

1

Jordan Fabian, Obama Vetoes Defense Bill, THE HILL (Oct. 22, 2015, 4:26 PM),
http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/257798-obama-vetoes-defense-bill [https://perma.cc/
D9KD-EK4E].
2
Message to the House of Representatives Returning Without Approval the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, 2015 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 750 (Oct. 22, 2015).
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Statement on Signing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, 2015 DAILY
COMP. PRES. DOC. 843 (Nov. 25, 2015).
6
Id.
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While this might be dismissed as “just politics,” the veto reflects real,
ongoing constitutional issues. As Harold Koh recently wrote, the separation
of powers issues presented by this bill and veto could “take us into largely
uncharted constitutional territory.”7 Professor Koh concludes that
presidential action contrary to these provisions “would stand even if
challenged” based on the President’s authority
as Prosecutor-in-Chief to “determine when and where to prosecute
[Guantánamo detainees], based on the facts and circumstances of each case
and our national security interests,” and as Diplomat-in-Chief and
Commander-in-Chief to decide and arrange through negotiations “when and
where to transfer them consistent with our national security and our humane
treatment policy.”8

Former White House officials Gregory B. Craig and Cliff Sloan echo
Professor Koh’s conclusions in an editorial.9
Professor Jack Goldsmith, however, takes issue with Professor Koh’s
conclusions, finding “the arguments for a comprehensive presidential
disregard of the homeland transfer restrictions are much more challenging
than Koh portrays.”10 Professor Marty Lederman comes to a similar
conclusion, finding that “there’s very little to be said for the merits of the
constitutional argument [to disregard the restrictions].”11 Other authors
have written about specific aspects of the restrictions, including Professors
Steve Vladeck12 and Ingrid Wuerth.13

7

Harold Hongju Koh, After the NDAA Veto: Now What?, JUST SECURITY (Oct. 23, 2015, 11:46
AM), https://www.justsecurity.org/27028/ndaa-veto-what/ [http://perma.cc/56QC-AL4G].
8
Id. (quoting Message to the House of Representatives Returning Without Approval the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, 2015 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 750 (Oct. 22, 2015)).
9
Gregory B. Craig & Cliff Sloan, The President Doesn’t Need Congress’s Permission to Close
Guantanamo, WASH. POST (Nov. 6, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-presidentdoesnt-need-congresss-permission-to-close-guantanamo/2015/11/06/4cc9d2ac-83f5-11e5-a7ca6ab6ec20f839_story.html [https://perma.cc/Z2UG-D3AA] (concluding Article II of the Constitution
gives President Obama “exclusive authority to determine the facilities in which military detainees are
held”).
10
Jack Goldsmith, A Weak Case for the Unconstitutionality of the Detainee Transfer Restrictions
(and a Glance at the Bigger Picture), LAWFARE (Oct. 26, 2015, 9:25 AM),
https://lawfareblog.com/weak-case-unconstitutionality-detainee-transfer-restrictions-and-glance-biggerpicture [https://perma.cc/UK6D-6UNT].
11
Marty Lederman, The Insoluble Guantánamo Problem (Part Three: Executive Disregard of the
GTMO-to-U.S. Relocation Prohibition Is Not a Solution), JUST SECURITY (Nov. 13, 2015, 8:41 AM),
https://www.justsecurity.org/27563/guantanamo-problem-remains-insoluble-part-three-executivedisregard-gtmo-restrictions-solution/ [https://perma.cc/LL7N-J8GX] (emphasis removed).
12
Steve Vladeck, The Bass-Ackwards Detainee Transfer Provision in the FY2016 NDAA, JUST
SECURITY (Oct. 1, 2015, 9:44 AM), https://www.justsecurity.org/26491/bass-ackward-detaineetransfer-provision-fy2016-ndaa/ [https://perma.cc/26BQ-NELC] (analyzing the general nature of the
2016 NDAA restrictions).
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This Essay takes the position that, with one exception, the 2016
NDAA restrictions (and previous NDAA restrictions) do not violate
separation of powers principles, despite the concerns stated in the
President’s signing statement. Part I provides background information on
the NDAA and the provisions within the Act relating to Guantánamo
detainees. Part II considers the threshold question of whether Congress can
substantively legislate through appropriations and authorizations acts rather
than standalone legislative acts. Finding that Congress can in fact legislate
through appropriations and authorizations acts, the Essay then turns in Part
III to the substantive issue of whether and to what extent Congress can
limit the President’s authority to conduct detention operations arising from
an armed conflict. In doing so, Part III examines the legal bases for
legislative and executive action, limits Congress can place on the executive
power in this area, and executive action that the President has staked out as
exceeding the limits placed on him by the Guantánamo provisions.14 The
Essay then concludes that, with one exception, the Guantánamo provisions
enacted to date are likely within the scope of Congress’s authority.
I.

THE GUANTÁNAMO PROVISIONS

The 2016 NDAA contains several provisions related to Guantánamo
detainees. Section 1031 prohibits the use of funds “to transfer, release, or
assist in the transfer or release to or within the United States, its territories,
or possessions” any non-U.S. citizen detained at Guantánamo Bay.15
Section 1032 prohibits the use of funds to “construct or modify any facility
in the United States” for the purpose of accepting a detainee from
Guantánamo Bay without congressional authorization.16 Section 1033
prohibits the release of detainees to certain countries.17 Section 1034
prohibits the transfer of detainees to other countries without congressional
approval.18 Section 1040 requires that the Executive submit reports to
Congress on the terms of any written agreements with foreign countries
who accept Guantánamo Bay detainees.19
13

Ingrid Wuerth, Detainee Transfer Restrictions and the Captures Clause of the U.S. Constitution,
LAWFARE (Oct. 28, 2015, 7:09 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/detainee-transfer-restrictions-andcaptures-clause-us-constitution [https://perma.cc/9DT6-GH6Z] (discussing the Captures Clause’s
application to property, not people).
14
This Essay collectively refers to the provisions discussed below as the “Guantánamo provisions.”
15
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-92, § 1031, 129 Stat.
726, 968 (2015).
16
Id. § 1032.
17
Id. § 1033.
18
Id. § 1034 (limiting transfers to Libya, Somalia, and Syria).
19
Id. § 1040.
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These provisions—or provisions substantively indistinguishable
therefrom20—first appeared in the Supplemental Appropriations Act of
2009.21 At that time, President Obama did not execute a signing statement
objecting to the provisions. Similar provisions arose again in the NDAA for
Fiscal Year 2011, the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013, and the NDAA for
Fiscal Year 2015. In these latter instances, President Obama issued signing
statements expressly objecting to the Guantánamo provisions.22 With
respect to all three bills, as well as the recently vetoed 2016 NDAA, the
President argued that the provisions represented an unconstitutional
intrusion upon his foreign affairs and Commander in Chief powers.
On the conduct of foreign affairs, the signing statement accompanying
the 2011 NDAA provides an example of the President’s concerns: the
Executive “must have the ability to act swiftly and to have broad flexibility
in conducting our negotiations with foreign countries.”23 With regard to
congressional intrusion on the President’s Commander in Chief powers, the
signing statement to the 2012 NDAA discounts attempts to control the
disposition of detainees as an intrusion “upon critical executive branch
authority to determine when and where to prosecute Guantánamo
detainees, based on the facts and the circumstances of each case and our
national security interests.”24 Further, the signing statement concludes by
finding the restrictions “hinder[] the executive’s ability to carry out its
military, national security, and foreign relations activities and . . . would,
under certain circumstances, violate constitutional separation of powers
principles.”25
The 2013 NDAA contained similar provisions to which the President
objected in another signing statement. Here, the restrictions were critically
broadened to include limitations on the disposition of detainees at the

20

A change in the 2016 NDAA of note is that the process for receiving congressional certification
for a transfer has grown more onerous.
21
Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-32, § 319, 123 Stat. 1859, 1874–75
(2009).
22
Statement on Signing the Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, 2014 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 945 (Dec. 19, 2014); Statement
on Signing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, 2013 DAILY COMP. PRES.
DOC. 4 (Jan. 2, 2013); Statement on Signing the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2011, 2011 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 10 (Jan. 7, 2011).
23
Statement on Signing the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011,
2011 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 10 (Jan. 7, 2011).
24
Statement on Signing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, 2011 DAILY
COMP. PRES. DOC. 978 (Dec. 31, 2011).
25
Id.
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detention facility in Parwan, Afghanistan.26 Addressing the restrictions
related to Afghanistan, the signing statement notes that:
Decisions regarding the disposition of detainees captured on foreign
battlefields have traditionally been based upon the judgment of experienced
military commanders and national security professionals without unwarranted
interference by Members of Congress. Section 1025 threatens to upend that
tradition, and could interfere with my ability as Commander in Chief to make
time-sensitive determinations about the appropriate disposition of detainees in
an active area of hostilities. Under certain circumstances, the section could
violate constitutional separation of powers principles.27

This dialogue reached its apogee in the President’s veto of the 2016
NDAA. Echoing his earlier signing statements, the veto statement argues
[t]he executive branch must have the flexibility, with regard to those detainees
who remain at Guantánamo, to determine when and where to prosecute them,
based on the facts and circumstances of each case and our national security
interests, and when and where to transfer them consistent with our national
security and our humane treatment policy.28

II. LEGISLATION THROUGH APPROPRIATION AND
AUTHORIZATION ACTS
Before considering the substantive constitutional issues raised by the
Guantánamo provisions, there exists the threshold issue of whether
Congress can effect these detention directives through an appropriations or
authorization bill. The Supreme Court has not addressed this issue head-on,
but two of its decisions are helpful in this regard. In short, case law
indicates that where Congress may not intrude on executive authority
directly, it may also not so intrude through appropriation or authorization
acts.
The Court first examined a similar issue in United States v. Klein,29 a
case arising in the aftermath of the Civil War. On December 8, 1863,
President Lincoln issued the Proclamation of Amnesty and Reconstruction,
which pardoned supporters of the Confederacy and offered full restoration
of any property seized on the basis of Confederate support upon an oath of

26

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, Pub. L. No. 112-239, § 1025, 126 Stat.
1632, 1913 (2013).
27
Statement on Signing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, 2013 DAILY
COMP. PRES. DOC. 4 (Jan. 2, 2013).
28
Message to the House of Representatives Returning Without Approval the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, 2015 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 750 (Oct. 22, 2015).
29
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872).
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loyalty to the federal government.30 The estate administrator for a decedent,
who qualified under the pardon, petitioned the courts for the proceeds from
the sale of cotton that had been confiscated from the decedent.31 The Court
of Claims awarded the proceeds to the estate and the Supreme Court
affirmed the ruling after the government filed an appeal.32 During the
appeal, and in response to a similar Supreme Court case,33 Congress passed
a law that prohibited the introduction as evidence of the President’s pardon
in a claim action against the government.34
The Court struck down the new law, ruling that it infringed on “the
constitutional power of the Executive.”35 Recalling the intention of the
Constitution to establish coordinated but independent branches of
government, the Court noted “the executive alone is intrusted [sic] the
power of pardon; and it is granted without limit.”36 “[T]he legislature
cannot change the effect of such a pardon,” the Court continued, “any more
than the executive can change a law.”37 This, then, is an example of an
instance in which the judiciary barred Congress from invading a sphere of
power exclusively reserved to the Executive.
The Court addressed a related issue almost eighty years later in United
States v. Lovett.38 There, the issue concerned a provision of an
appropriations bill which provided that “no salary or compensation should
be paid” to certain federal employees who had been indicted by the House
Committee on Un-American Activities.39 Affected employees challenged
the bill as, alternatively, an unlawful bill of attainder, a due process
violation, and an unconstitutional “encroachment on exclusive executive
authority,”40 since “the power to remove executive employees [is] a power
not entrusted to Congress but to the Executive Branch of Government.”41
30

Proclamation No. 11, 13 Stat. 737 (Dec. 8, 1863).
Klein, 80 U.S. at 132.
32
Id.
33
See United States v. Padelford, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 531 (1870) (affirming an award of proceeds to
a plaintiff who complied with the President’s pardon requirements).
34
See Act of July 12, 1870, ch. 251, 16 Stat. 230, 235 (1869–71) (“[N]o pardon or amnesty granted
by the President, whether general or special, by proclamation or otherwise, nor any acceptance of such
pardon or amnesty, nor oath taken, or other act performed in pursuance or as a condition thereof, shall
be admissible in evidence on the part of any claimant in the court of claims as evidence in support of
any claim against the United States . . . .”).
35
Klein, 80 U.S. at 147.
36
Id.
37
Id. at 148.
38
328 U.S. 303 (1946).
39
Id. at 305, 308.
40
Id. at 307.
41
Id. at 306.
31
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The Court struck down the bill as an unlawful bill of attainder.42 While the
Court did not rule on the separation of powers issue, they addressed two
relevant arguments. First, they rejected the argument that the appropriations
powers “are plenary and not subject to judicial review.”43 Second, the Court
noted that Congress could not accomplish through an appropriations act
that which they could not accomplish lawfully through an act of
legislation.44
Read in conjunction, Klein and Lovett indicate that congressional
appropriations and authorizations acts may raise the separation of powers
concerns raised by the President in his veto statement. For the purposes of
this Essay, this Part demonstrates that the Guantánamo provisions may be
unconstitutional if their effect is to intrude on powers reserved to the
Executive, albeit through appropriations and authorizations rather than as
direct impediments to presidential actions.
III. DISCUSSION
In order to assess whether the Guantánamo provisions are
substantively constitutional and what President Obama may do in response,
it is essential to examine the interaction of constitutional powers and duties
vested in the Executive and in Congress. This Part performs that analysis.
Section A considers what constitutional provisions grant Congress
authority to enact the Guantánamo provisions. Section B then sheds light
on the authority vested in the President by Article II. Section C zeroes in on
congressional and presidential authority for detention, and Section D closes
the analysis by considering the consequences of the President acting
contrary to congressional acts purporting to grant or limit detention
authority.

42

Id. at 315.
Id. at 307.
44
Id. at 316–17 (“No one would think that Congress could have passed a valid law, stating that
after investigation it had found [plaintiffs] ‘guilty’ of the crime of engaging in ‘subversive activities,’
defined that term for the first time, and sentenced them to perpetual exclusion from any government
employment. Section 304, while it does not use that language, accomplishes that result. The effect was
to inflict punishment without the safeguards of a judicial trial and ‘determined by no previous law or
fixed rule.’ The Constitution declares that that cannot be done either by a State or by the United States.”
(footnote omitted)); see also Nat’l Fed’n of Fed. Emps. v. United States, 688 F. Supp. 671, 684 n.17
(D.D.C. 1988) (“Congress cannot accomplish that which by direct legislative action would be beyond
its constitutional authority.” (citing Lovett, 328 U.S. at 316)), vacated sub nom. Am. Foreign Serv.
Ass’n v. Garfinkel, 490 U.S. 153 (1989); Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of
Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252, 255 (1991) (striking down a “‘Board of Review’ composed of nine
Members of Congress and vested with veto power” over the Metropolitan Washington Airports
Authority as an unconstitutional restriction on executive power).
43
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A. The Basis of Authority for Legislative Action
If we accept the idea that “Congress cannot accomplish that which by
direct legislative action would be beyond its constitutional authority,”45
then, presumably, the converse would be also be true: What Congress can
do through a lawful act of legislation it can do through an appropriations or
authorization bill. In order to determine whether Congress lawfully enacted
the Guantánamo authorization and appropriation provisions, then, the
relevant inquiry is: What is the constitutional basis for direct congressional
action on these issues?
The constitutional authority for the NDAA can be found in Article I,
Section 8 of the Constitution. This foundational provision provides that
“Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and
Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general
Welfare of the United States . . . .”46 Relevant to the Guantánamo detainee
issue, however, Congress appears to be attempting not simply to fund the
government, but rather to control the foreign affairs of the country. The
Constitution contains scant direct support for any such congressional
authority. In the area of foreign affairs generally, express congressional
powers are limited to the declaration of war,47 the regulation of commerce
with foreign nations,48 the advice and consent role in approving
ambassadors,49 and the spending power.50
In contrast, Congress finds myriad authorities specifically regarding
defense-related legislation, including the power to “provide for the
common Defence,”51 “[t]o raise and support Armies,”52 “[t]o provide and
maintain a Navy,”53 “[t]o make Rules for the Government and Regulation
of the land and naval Forces,”54 and “[t]o declare War, grant Letters of
Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and
Water.”55 Collectively, these authorities—taken together with the

45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55

Nat’l Fed’n of Fed. Emps, 688 F. Supp. at 684 n.17 (citing Lovett, 328 U.S. at 316).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
Id.
Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 13.
Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.

1341

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

Necessary and Proper Clause56—create expansive powers regarding the
military and, by extension, military affairs to include detention operations.
As early as 1800, in Bas v. Tingy, the Court found the Congress can
declare war with a scope of their choosing.57 The next year in Talbot v.
Seeman, the Court found “[t]he whole powers of war being, by the
constitution of the United States, vested in congress.”58 The Court
reaffirmed the breadth of congressional powers over military affairs in
United States v. O’Brien, where the Supreme Court found that “[t]he
constitutional power of Congress to raise and support armies and to make
all laws necessary and proper to that end is broad and sweeping.”59 Despite
far-reaching endorsements of congressional powers to regulate the military,
in practice Congress has rarely intervened in the conduct of detention on
the battlefield.60
B. The Basis of Authority for Executive Action
Though broad and sweeping, congressional powers regarding military
affairs are not plenary. As with congressional powers, there are ample
constitutional sources of executive authority in this area.61 Of the
56

Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (Congress shall have the power to “make all Laws which shall be necessary
and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”).
57
4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37, 43 (1800) (opinion of Chase, J.) (“Congress is empowered to declare a
general war, or congress may wage a limited war . . . .”).
58
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 28 (1801).
59
391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968); see also Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 301 (1983) (affirming
Congress’s power to establish “the framework of the Military Establishment”).
60
See generally David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest
Ebb—A Constitutional History, 121 HARV. L. REV. 941 (2008) (discussing how the War Powers have
been treated by the Executive and Legislature since 1789, and concluding that Congress has historically
placed legislative restraints on the conduct of wars); David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The
Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb—Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding,
121 HARV. L. REV. 689, 712–20 (2008) (assessing the structural and historical reasons for the current
debate over the President’s assertion of a unilateral authority over the use of force); Christopher M.
Ford, From Nadir to Zenith: The Power to Detain in War, 207 MIL. L. REV. 203, 204 (2011)
(recognizing the tension between congressional and presidential power regarding the power to detain
individuals on the battlefield).
61
Beyond the specific constitutional provisions discussed below, some scholars have pointed to the
textual construct of Article I and Article II and have argued the grant of powers in Article II are
inherently permissive, whereas Article I only provides powers that are expressly granted. See Saikrishna
B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231, 256–
57 (2001) (“Yet when one compares the introductory clauses of the first three Articles, the Article II
Vesting Clause must be read as a grant of power. The Article I Vesting Clause explicitly indicates that
Congress’s legislative powers only extend to those powers ‘herein granted.’ The Article II Vesting
Clause lacks such language, thereby suggesting that it may vest powers beyond those subsequently
enumerated.” (citation omitted)). This argument has been the subject of considerable debate. See
generally Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 641 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)
(“I cannot accept the view that this clause is a grant in bulk of all conceivable executive power but
regard it as an allocation to the presidential office of the generic powers thereafter stated.”); Curtis A.
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enumerated executive powers, the Commander in Chief power is by far the
most compelling and relevant source for the President’s authority to make
key defense policy decisions. In Fleming v. Page, the Court held that “[a]s
commander-in-chief, [the President] is authorized to direct the movements
of the naval and military forces placed by law at his command, and to
employ them in the manner he may deem most effectual . . . .”62 The
purpose of the Commander in Chief Clause is to “vest in the President the
supreme command over all the military forces,—such supreme and
undivided command as would be necessary to the prosecution of a
successful war.”63 The Court reached a similar conclusion in Reid v.
Covert, where it held that, “[i]n the face of an actively hostile enemy,
military commanders necessarily have broad power over persons on the
battlefront.”64 The Presidential Oath of Office, found in the Constitution,
further affirms the role of the President as Commander in Chief; to wit, the
President is required to “preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of
the United States.”65
A government brief in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld provides a neat synopsis of
the President’s Commander in Chief authority in the context of detentions
in war time:
The challenged exercise of authority falls within the President’s core war
powers, comes with the statutory authorization of Congress, and directly
implicates vital national security interests in defending the Nation against an
unprincipled, unconventional, and savage enemy. . . .
....
. . . This case directly involves the President’s core functions as Commander
in Chief in wartime: the capture, detention, and treatment of the enemy and
the collection and evaluation of intelligence vital to national security.
Furthermore, the President here is acting with the added measure of the
express statutory backing of Congress.66

Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign Affairs, 102 MICH. L. REV.
545, 546 (2004) (While not endorsing the theory, the authors note the “textual difference [between
Article I and Article II], usually bolstered with historical materials, has long undergirded the claim that
the Article II Vesting Clause implicitly grants the President a broad array of residual powers not
specified in the remainder of Article II.”).
62
50 U.S. (9 How.) 603, 615 (1850).
63
United States v. Sweeny, 157 U.S. 281, 284 (1895); see also Nordmann v. Woodring, 28 F.
Supp. 573, 576 (W.D. Okla. 1939) (“[A]s Commander in Chief, the President has the power to employ
the Army and the Navy in a manner which he may deem most effectual.”).
64
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 33 (1957).
65
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8.
66
Brief for Respondents-Appellants at 9, 13–14, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 2002)
(No. 02-6895), 2002 WL 32728567 (citing Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-
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Undergirding all jurisprudence related to military affairs is a
longstanding tradition of deference to the Executive over military affairs. In
Department of the Navy v. Egan, the Supreme Court held that “unless
Congress specifically has provided otherwise, courts traditionally have
been reluctant to intrude upon the authority of the Executive in military and
national security affairs.”67 Similarly, in Youngstown, Justice Jackson
argued that he, as a member of the Court, “should indulge the widest
latitude of interpretation to sustain [the President’s] exclusive function to
command the instruments of national force, at least when turned against the
outside world for the security of our society.”68
Deference to the President’s authority extends to areas beyond
military and defense policy. The Executive has also long been regarded as
paramount in the field of foreign affairs.69 In United States v. CurtissWright Export Corp., the Supreme Court famously—and controversially—
found that the Executive’s authority in foreign affairs represents the
plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal
government in the field of international relations—a power which does not
require as a basis for its exercise an act of Congress, but which, of course, like
every other governmental power, must be exercised in subordination to the
applicable provisions of the Constitution.70

While Curtiss-Wright has been roundly criticized for overstating the
breadth of executive powers in foreign affairs,71 other cases have supported
40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (granting the President authorization to use force against parties involved in
the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks); Youngstown, 343 U.S at 635–37 & n.2 (Jackson, J.,
concurring)).
67
484 U.S. 518, 530 (1988).
68
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 645 (Jackson, J., concurring). But see id. at 645–46 (noting that when
the President focuses his power domestically, the Court should not indulge the President in the same
way).
69
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936); see also Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 812 n.19 (1982) (noting that the conduct of foreign affairs is one of the
“‘central’ Presidential domains”).
70
Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 320 (emphasis added); see also United States v. Kuok, 671 F.3d 931,
939 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Curtiss-Wright as authority for the proposition that the President is the sole
organ in foreign affairs); United States v. Amirnazmi, 645 F.3d 564, 578–79 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing
Curtiss-Wright as authority for the proposition that the courts broadly interpret Congress’s grants of the
foreign affairs power to the President); cf. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 661–62 (1981)
(citing Curtiss-Wright and Youngstown in acknowledging the President’s role in foreign affairs, but
discussing the difficulty of making widely applicable rules of executive power in the foreign relations
context).
71
See, e.g., Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2115 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“The
expansive language in Curtiss-Wright casting the President as the ‘sole organ’ of the Nation in foreign
affairs certainly has attraction for members of the Executive Branch. . . . But our precedents have never
accepted such a sweeping understanding of executive power.”); Michael D. Ramsey, The Myth of
Extraconstitutional Foreign Affairs Power, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 379, 379–80 (2000) (citing
MICHAEL J. GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY 18–34 (1990); HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE
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the idea that the conduct of foreign affairs is one of the “‘central’
Presidential domains.”72
C. Congressional Limits on the Power to Detain
As the dispute over the Guantánamo provisions illustrates, there is
fundamental disagreement between the branches regarding the nature and
breadth of authority in the area of detentions. In Youngstown Sheet & Tube
v. Sawyer, the Supreme Court famously examined overlapping executive
and legislative authorities in the context of a national security issue. There,
Justice Robert Jackson’s concurring opinion—widely regarded as the
definitive statement on the separation of powers between the President and
Congress—articulates three situations in which the President may act,
ranging from actions consistent to those inconsistent with legislative
action.73 This framework is useful for assessing which branch reigns
supreme when Congress and the President conflict over matters of national
defense and foreign affairs.
What authority then does the Executive have with regard to detention
operations generally? There is no constitutional provision specifically
regarding the authority to detain during armed conflict. Where the Court
has addressed the issue, they have simply found that seizure and detention
of enemy combatants in armed conflict is an “important incident to the
conduct of war.”74 Some argue that, in such circumstances, war-related
powers “not granted exclusively to Congress are vested concurrently with
the President and Congress, meaning that either can exercise such

NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 94 (1990);
Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs and Federalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 1617, 1659–61
(1997) (detailing the critics of Curtiss-Wright).
72
Harlow, 457 U.S. at 812 n.19; see also Egan, 484 U.S. at 529; Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511,
540 (1985) (citing Harlow with approval); Goldsmith, supra note 71, at 1684 (“Foreign relations is (and
is perceived to be) the President’s responsibility.”).
73
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635–37 (Jackson, J., concurring). First, “[w]hen the President acts
pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it
includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate.” Id. at 635. The
second category includes situations where “the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant
or denial of authority.” Id. at 637. In these situations, the President is acting in a “zone of twilight in
which [the President] and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is
uncertain.” Id. The third situation is where “the President takes measures incompatible with the
expressed or implied will of Congress.” Id. In this situation the President’s “power is at its lowest ebb,
for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of
Congress over the matter.” Id.
74
Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28–31 (1942); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004) (“The
capture and detention of lawful combatants and the capture, detention, and trial of unlawful combatants,
by ‘universal agreement and practice,’ are ‘important incident[s] of war.’”) (quoting Ex parte Quirin,
317 U.S. at 28, 30).
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authorities.”75 However, under Justice Jackson’s framework in Youngstown,
where Congress has acted, the President “may not disregard limitations that
Congress has, in proper exercise of its own war powers, placed on his
powers.”76
With regard to detentions in armed conflicts, Congress has taken a
number of legislative actions. These include the Detainee Treatment Act,77
the Military Commissions Act,78 and the Uniting and Strengthening
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (PATRIOT Act).79 Of these Acts, only two
approach anything close to the directives found in the Guantánamo
provisions. The first is the Detainee Treatment Act, a short piece of
legislation prohibiting the “cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment” of any “individual in the custody or under the physical control
of the United States Government.”80 This is the full extent of its directives
regarding the disposition of detainees. Notably, the Act specifically defers
to the Executive on the tactical handling of the detainees: “[n]o person in
the custody or under the effective control of the Department of Defense or
under detention in a Department of Defense facility shall be subject to any
treatment or technique of interrogation not authorized by and listed in the
United States Army Field Manual on Intelligence Interrogation,” a
document which is written and promulgated by a component of the
Department of Defense.81
The other legislative action arguably approaching control over
detainees is the PATRIOT Act. There, at least one court found that
“Congress carefully stated how it wished the Government to handle aliens
believed to be terrorists who were seized and held within the United
States.”82 In reality, however, the relevant provisions are not onerous; they
only direct that certain individuals be charged within certain periods of

75

Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The Separation and Overlap of War and Military Powers,
87 TEX. L. REV. 299, 304 (2008).
76
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 593 n.23 (2006) (citing Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637
(Jackson, J., concurring)); see also Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 147 (1814) (“If,
indeed, there be a limit imposed as to the extent to which hostilities may be carried by the executive, I
admit that the executive cannot lawfully transcend that limit . . . .”).
77
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, tit. X, 119 Stat. 2739 (2005).
78
Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006).
79
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (PATRIOT Act), Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
80
Detainee Treatment Act § 1003(a).
81
Id. § 1002(a) (emphasis added).
82
Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213, 248 (4th Cir. 2008) (en banc), vacated as moot sub nom.
al-Marri v. Spagone, 555 U.S. 1220 (2009) (mem.).
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time83 and limit indefinite detentions.84 These provisions are not nearly as
directive as the Guantánamo provisions. For example, while the PATRIOT
Act requires the Attorney General to maintain custody over certain
detainees, it does not direct where they are to be held or otherwise restrict
their movement.85 The Guantánamo provisions, on the other hand, impose
explicit restrictions and requirements on the movement of detainees.86
Further, the PATRIOT Act concerned domestic law enforcement, while the
Guantánamo provisions deal with individuals captured overseas in an
armed conflict. Thus, the PATRIOT Act is not a perfect analogue for the
Guantánamo provisions.
Despite these varied legislative actions relating to detentions, both
Presidents Obama and Bush relied on the Authorization for Use of Military
Force (AUMF), and the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against
Iraq87—legislation which does not reference detention.88 Still, this reading
remains unchallenged.
D. Executive Action Contrary to the Guantánamo Provisions
As this Essay has shown thus far, while Congress has not legislated on
the great majority of the general conduct of detention operations, it has
unequivocally expressed opposition to certain actions regarding the
movement or transfer of detainees from Guantánamo Bay.89 Any action
contrary to these provisions would place the President firmly on the far end
of Justice Jackson’s spectrum of authority. Here, presidential “power is at
its lowest ebb” and requires the President to act “upon his own
constitutional powers.”90 What inherent powers, then, does the President
possess to make determinations regarding the disposition of detainees

83

PATRIOT Act § 412.
Id.
85
Id.
86
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-92, §§ 1031–36,
1040, 129 Stat. 726, 968–73, 975 (2015).
87
Brief for Respondents-Appellants at 14, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 2002) (No.
02-6895), 2002 WL 32728567 (citing Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40,
115 Stat. 224 (2001)) (Bush Administration argument that “the President here is acting with the added
measure of the express statutory backing of Congress”); Respondents’ Memorandum Regarding the
Government’s Detention Authority Relative to Detainees Held at Guantanamo Bay at 1, In re
Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., Misc. No. 08-442 (TFH) (D.D.C. Mar. 13, 2009) (Obama
Administration noting that “[t]he United States bases its detention authority as to such persons on the
Authorization for the Use of Military Force”).
88
Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-243,
116 Stat. 1498 (2002); Authorization for Use of Military Force.
89
See supra notes 15–19 and accompanying text.
90
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
84
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captured in an armed conflict? In his various signing statements, President
Obama eschews claims of inherent or unitary authority to act in the area of
detention in foreign combat. Instead, he argues more broadly that the
Guantánamo provisions intrude on two aspects of executive power: powers
related to the conduct of foreign affairs and powers related to the conduct
of armed conflict. This Section reviews those arguments in turn.
1. The Conduct of Foreign Affairs—The President has argued that
the Executive “must have the ability to act swiftly and to have broad
flexibility in conducting our negotiations with foreign countries.”91 Two
provisions in the 2016 NDAA implicate this concern: Section 1033
prohibits the release of detainees to certain countries,92 and Section 1034
prohibits the transfer of detainees to other countries without congressional
approval.93
It is self-evident that transferring individuals captured in armed
conflict to various countries implicates foreign affairs. As of the date of this
Essay, the U.S. has transferred several hundred detainees to fifty-seven
countries.94 Each move requires the identification of a transfer country,
acquiescence by that foreign government, and negotiations between the
United States and the transfer government regarding responsibilities for
each government regarding the transfer. A recent move of ten Yemeni
citizens to Oman, for instance, was the culmination of a multi-phased
agreement that took more than a year to negotiate.95 Further, the 2016
NDAA implicates the President’s foreign affairs power more than past
versions of the legislation; it contains new provisions that require the
Secretary of Defense to certify that the transfer is “in the national security
interests of the United States.”96
In debates over the preeminence of the Executive over Congress in the
field of foreign affairs, Curtiss-Wright is the natural starting point. As
noted above, the case has been widely criticized for too broadly

91

Statement on Signing the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011,
2011 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 10 (Jan. 7, 2011).
92
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-92, § 1033, 129 Stat.
726, 968–69 (2015) (banning transfers to Libya, Somalia, and Syria).
93
Id. § 1034.
94
Andrei Scheinkman et. al., The Guantanamo Docket: Transfer Countries, N.Y. TIMES,
http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo/transfer-countries
(last
updated
Jan.
21,
2016)
[https://perma.cc/VE9B-EKNJ].
95
Adam Goldman & Missy Ryan, Issue of Where to Move Guantanamo Detainees Threatens
Closure Plan, WASH. POST (Aug. 10, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationalsecurity/guantanamo-closure-plan-suffers-setback-over-us-site-for-detainees/2015/08/10/1540c2e03f68-11e5-9561-4b3dc93e3b9a_story.html [https://perma.cc/3CDN-N948].
96
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 § 1034(b)(1).
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characterizing the President’s powers.97 The Supreme Court recently
reexamined Curtiss-Wright in Zivotofsky v. Kerry and concluded “CurtissWright did not hold that the President is free from Congress’ lawmaking
power in the field of international relations.”98 Accepting, as some might
still, that Curtiss-Wright and other cases stand for the proposition that the
Executive enjoys a greater breadth of powers in foreign affairs vis-à-vis
domestic affairs,99 executive action must still “stem either from an act of
Congress or from the Constitution itself.”100 Such action, furthermore, “is
not free from the ordinary controls and checks of Congress merely because
foreign affairs are at issue.”101
In Zivotofsky, the Court upheld the Executive’s actions concerning
foreign affairs in the face of contradictory legislation. This case arose from
the birth of the petitioner to U.S. citizens living in Jerusalem.102
Zivotofsky’s mother sought to have “Israel” listed as the place of his birth
on his passport and the consular report of birth abroad in accordance with
the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003. The Act states
that “[f]or purposes of the registration of birth . . . or issuance of a passport
of a United States citizen born in the city of Jerusalem, the Secretary shall,
upon the request of the citizen or the citizen’s legal guardian, record the
place of birth as Israel.”103 This provision, however, runs counter to longstanding U.S. policy concerning the status of Jerusalem. In a signing
statement, President Bush noted that this section “impermissibly interferes
with the President’s constitutional authority to conduct the Nation’s foreign
affairs and . . . to formulate the position of the United States, speak for the

97

See sources cited supra note 71.
135 S. Ct. 2076, 2090 (2015). This case is not to be confused with Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S.
Ct. 1421 (2012), in which the Court found the political question doctrine did not bar judicial
consideration of the issue.
99
See, e.g., Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 523–24 (2008) (“The United States maintains that the
President’s constitutional role ‘uniquely qualifies’ him to resolve the sensitive foreign policy decisions
that bear on compliance with an ICJ decision and ‘to do so expeditiously.’. . . We do not question these
propositions.” (citation omitted)); First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 767
(1972) (plurality opinion) (“[T]his Court has recognized the primacy of the Executive in the conduct of
foreign relations quite . . . emphatically . . . .”); see also United States v. Kuok, 671 F.3d 931, 939 (9th
Cir. 2012) (citing Curtiss-Wright as authority for the proposition that the President is the sole organ in
foreign affairs); United States v. Amirnazmi, 645 F.3d 564, 578–79 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing CurtissWright as authority for the proposition that the courts broadly interpret Congress’s grants of foreign
affairs power to the President).
100
Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952).
101
Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2090.
102
Id. at 2083.
103
Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-228, § 214(d),
116 Stat. 1350, 1366 (2002).
98
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Nation in international affairs, and determine the terms on which
recognition is given to foreign states.”104
The Court found that “judicial precedent and historical practice teach
that it is for the President alone to make the specific decision of what
foreign power he will recognize as legitimate.”105 In contrast to the
recognition of foreign governments at issue in Zivotofsky, there is no case
law on point and no historical claims by the Executive—save for the Bush
Administration106—over the inherent authority to conduct detention
operations. Given the lack of case law and definitive historical practice, it
is impossible to conclude that the power to conduct detention operations as
a function of the foreign affairs power “resides in the President alone.”107
2. The Conduct of Armed Conflict—President Obama’s second
argument concerns the “executive’s ability to carry out its military, national
security, and foreign relations activities.”108 The Bush Administration
expressly and consistently argued that this power included an inherent
power to detain,109 a power the Administration noted was “at the heart of
[the President’s] constitutional powers as Commander in Chief.”110 In
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Court declined to address these claims, agreeing
instead “with the Government’s alternative position, that Congress has in
fact authorized Hamdi’s detention, through the AUMF.”111 The Obama
Administration, too, has relied exclusively on the authority found in the
AUMF.112
The Court’s failure to rule on whether the Executive has inherent
authority to detain does not, of course, preclude the existence of such
authority. As opposed to President Obama’s claim regarding his conduct of
foreign affairs, where there was no historical or judicial precedent, here
104

Statement on Signing the Foreign Relations Act, Fiscal Year 2003, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
DOC. 1658, 1659 (Sept. 30, 2002).
105
Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2090.
106
See, e.g., Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43, 53 n.4 (D.D.C. 2009) (citing Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 516–17 (2004) (plurality opinion) and al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213,
221 (4th Cir. 2008), vacated as moot sub nom. al-Marri v. Spagone, 555 U.S. 1220 (2009)) (noting that
the Bush Administration has argued that it “could detain individuals pursuant to the President’s
authority as Commander-in-Chief.”).
107
Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2094.
108
Statement on Signing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012,
2011 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 978 (Dec. 31, 2011).
109
See cases cited supra note 106.
110
Brief for the Petitioner at 27, Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004) (No. 03-1027),
2004 WL 542777, at *27.
111
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 517.
112
Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43, 53 (D.D.C. 2009) (noting that the Obama
Administration “clarified that it believes that its detention authority arises solely from the AUMF”).
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there is substantial historical and judicial support for the existence of some
inherent detention authority in the Executive’s Commander in Chief
powers. The Executive has conducted foreign detention operations absent
legislative action in every armed conflict in this nation’s history.113 This
includes establishing the policies of whom, when, and where detainees
would be taken as well as the issues regarding the disposition of detainees.
As the Court noted elsewhere in Hamdi, “detention to prevent a
combatant’s return to the battlefield is a fundamental incident of waging
war.”114 The President’s role in waging war and, by extension, conducting
detention operations, is extensive. William Howard Taft once wrote that
the Commander in Chief Clause precludes Congress from “order[ing]
battles to be fought on a certain plan” or “direct[ing] parts of the army to be
moved from one part of the country to another.”115 This passage echoes
Chief Justice Chase’s concurring opinion in Ex parte Milligan, where he
wrote that Congress’s war powers extended “to all legislation essential to
the prosecution of war with vigor and success, except such as interferes
with the command of the forces and the conduct of campaigns. That power
and duty belong to the President as commander-in-chief.”116 Similarly, the
Supreme Court held in Fleming v. Page that “[a]s commander-in-chief, [the
President] is authorized to direct the movements of the naval and military
forces placed by law at his command, and to employ them in the manner he
may deem most effectual.”117 These holdings all highlight that the
Commander in Chief Clause seeks to create a “supreme and undivided
command.”118
This is, of course, a pragmatic concern, as successful military
operations required unified command, speed, decisiveness, and secrecy;
traits which lend themselves, as Alexander Hamilton noted in The
Federalist Papers, to a singular executive rather than a legislative body.119
113

See Ford, supra note 60, at 204; see also Barron & Lederman, supra note 60, at 977 (noting that
during the War of 1812 “Congress did pass several statutes dealing with the specific issue of prisoners
of war, authorizing the President to make such regulations and arrangements for their safekeeping and
support ‘as he may deem expedient,’ but only ‘until the same shall be otherwise provided for by law’”
(citation omitted)).
114
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 519.
115
William Howard Taft, The Boundaries Between the Executive, the Legislative and the Judicial
Branches of the Government, 25 YALE L.J. 599, 610 (1916).
116
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 139 (1866) (Chase, C.J., concurring).
117
50 U.S. (9 How.) 603, 615 (1850).
118
United States v. Sweeny, 157 U.S. 281, 284 (1895).
119
THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 355 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009) (“Decision,
activity, secrecy, and despatch [sic] will generally characterize the proceedings of one man in a much
more eminent degree than the proceedings of any greater number; and in proportion as the number is
increased, these qualities will be diminished.”).
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Then-Attorney General Robert Jackson reached a similar conclusion in a
1941 memorandum, finding that
the President’s responsibility as Commander in Chief embraces the authority
to command and direct the armed forces in their immediate movements and
operations designed to protect the security and effectuate the defense of the
United States. . . . [T]his authority undoubtedly includes the power to dispose
of troops and equipment in such manner and on such duties as best to promote
the safety of the country.120

Looking to both case law and past practice, the Executive exercises
broad control over the tactical conduct of hostilities including the conduct
of detention operations on the battlefield. Where, however, aspects of the
armed conflict move away from the battlefield, “[t]he exigencies which
have required military rule on the battlefront are not present in areas where
no conflict exists.”121 Thus, the Executive’s authority over detention
operations diminishes as those operations move further and further from
the battlefield.
Where Congress has not acted on the issue, the President possesses
broad authority to conduct detention operations, because his authority is at
its maximum. Where Congress has acted, the constitutionality of
presidential action is contingent on the nature of the actions. Thus, a
legislative act requiring the detention of a particular individual on a
battlefield would be unconstitutional because it would intrude too far into
the President’s power to exercise command over battlefield decisions.
Conversely, legislation restricting the movement of detainees outside the
parameters of the hot battlefield would likely be constitutional.
Applying these principles to the Guantánamo provisions, Congress
acted within its authority to limit the expenditure of money to transfer
detainees into the United States. In the same vein, Congress likely
exceeded its authority in the 2013 NDAA by including provisions detailing
detention activities on the foreign battlefield. Here, the President’s
authority is exclusive.

CONCLUSION
More than twenty years ago, Chief Justice Burger warned that “[t]he
hydraulic pressure inherent within each of the separate Branches to exceed
the outer limits of its power, even to accomplish desirable objectives, must
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be resisted.”122 The Guantánamo provisions represent a cluster of such
pressures. The situation is made markedly more complex by lack of judicial
decisions on point and a lack of congressional guidance to the President in
the Authorization for Use of Military Force, which expressly discusses
detention operations. Plainly, the Executive’s authority over the conduct of
hostilities is vast. Where Congress has expressly spoken, however—
particularly with regard to activities occurring away from the battlefront—
the Executive’s authority is diminished. Here, with the notable exception of
the provisions in the 2013 NDAA relating to detainees in Afghanistan, the
Guantánamo provisions likely do not unconstitutionally invade the
President’s authority over foreign affairs and armed conflict, and thus,
despite raising complex separation of powers questions, are likely
constitutional.
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INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983).
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